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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH B. SCHULTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 20010908 - CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I 
THERE WAS ONLY ONE ORDER OF RESTITUTION AND 
IT WAS SIGNED ON SEPTEMBER 8,1997 
The State's argument that there were two restitution orders is incorrect. The 
only order of restitution was signed by the Board of Pardons on September 8, 1997, a 
month after Mr. Schultz had been terminated. The State argues that "two restitution 
orders were necessary in this case" (State's Brief, p. 6), but never explains why. One 
proper restitution order would have been sufficient. If a valid order of restitution existed 
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prior to termination, the Board could have merely forwarded a copy of that order to the 
district court to have a judgment entered against Mr. Schultz just as it did with the 
September 8th order (See R. 02). There would have been no need to enter a "second 
order." 
The State argues that the August 5, 1997 decision terminating sentence and 
parole was an order of restitution; however, the document does not purport to be an order 
of restitution, is not styled as an order of restitution and in fact it does not order 
restitution; rather, it states that a request for restitution "is to be forwarded to the 
Sentencing Court." No where does it order Mr. Schultz to pay restitution. The fact that 
the Board itself did not believe that its August 5th decision constituted an order of 
restitution is clearly indicated by the fact that a month later the Board entered a document 
styled as an order of restitution that ordered Mr. Schultz to pay $3,798.43 in restitution. 
If the Board believed that its August 5th decision constituted an order of restitution, there 
would have been no need to enter a "second Board order" as it is characterized by the 
State. If a previous valid order existed, the September 8th order would be superfluous. 
The fact that the Board entered the September 8th order plainly shows that it knew that it 
had not previously ordered Mr. Schultz to pay restitution. In addition, the civil judgment 
i 
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entered by the court related only to the September 8th order; not to the August 5th decision 
of the special attention hearing.1 
Schultz has repeatedly pointed out, however, that by the time the Board got 
around to entering the September 8th order, it had lost jurisdiction over him because his 
sentence had been terminated. 
II 
THE BOARD DID NOT FOLLOW THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPOSING RESTITUTION 
The State has produced a secret internal memo (Board action routing slip) to 
justify the restitution amount. That memo, however, was not communicated to Schultz. 
The entries set forth in the secret memo are not contained in any of the Board's hearings 
nor in the August 5th termination order, nor in the September 8th order of restitution. No 
findings of fact were made at the restitution hearing. No findings of fact were made at the 
review hearing. 
Section 76-3-201 (8) (c), UTAH CODE ANN. requires more than the calculation 
of the amount of restitution. Under that statute, the Board is required to consider and 
make the following findings: 
1
 The order provides that 'This order shall be forwarded to the District Court... 
and shall constitute a lien . . . when entered on the court's docket." R. 03 (emphasis 
added). 
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1. The financial resources of the Defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose. 
2. The ability of the Defendant to pay restitution. 
3. The rehabilitative effect on the Defendant of the payment of restitution. 
4. Other circumstances which make restitution inappropriate. 
None of those findings were made and none are contained in any of the Board's 
documents. A secret memorandum, that only surfaced as an exhibit after Schultz had 
challenged the civil judgment that had been entered against him, is insufficient and does 
not meet the statutory requirements imposed upon the Board of Pardons through Monson 
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Utah 1996). 
We agree that the language of section 77-27-5 mandates that the Board must 
follow both the substantive standards of section 76-3-201 and its procedural 
requirements. It must not only consider the four statutory factors when it orders 
restitution as a condition of parole, but it must also comply with the same 
procedural requirements imposed on a trial court, e. g. it shall make a record of 
the reasons for its decision. 
Ill 
A VICTIM CANNOT COLLECT BOARD IMPOSED 
RESTITUTION 
Merely because a valid restitution order is subject to "civil collection remedies," 
it does not follow the victim can substitute herself as a plaintiff in this case and collect the 
restitution in her own name. 
4 
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Under §77-18-6 (b) (iv), UTAH CODE ANN., a victim may collect restitution 
where there has been a judgment of conviction that orders its payment; however, there is 
no corresponding statute authorizing a victim to collect restitution imposed by the Board. 
Implicit in §77-18-6 (b) (iv), UTAH CODE ANN. is the proposition that without that 
statutory authority, a victim may not collect a restitution order. 
Ms. Everton made no motion to intervene or to substitute herself as a plaintiff in 
this matter. She merely had a writ of garnishment issued in her name by the court clerk 
and proceeded to attempt to attach Mr. Schultz's wages. This she cannot do. Even if the 
restitution order is subject to "civil collection remedies," those remedies must be 
exercised by the plaintiff (i.e. the State) and not by Ms. Everton. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of September 8th is the only order of restitution; however, it was 
entered by the Board after it lost jurisdiction over Mr. Schultz. The Board's secret 
internal memorandum does not satisfy the statutory requirements for specific findings if 
restitution is ordered. Ms. Everton is not the plaintiff in this matter and may not collect 
the restitution (even if the order were valid) in her own name. The memorandum decision 
of Judge Taylor should be reversed. 
DATED this of April, 2002. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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